CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WARRANTLESS FELONY ARRESTS MADE
IN PUBLIC ARE VALID DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT
TIME TO OBTAIN A WARRANT; THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES"
SENT WAS

TEST APPLIES TO CONSENT
GIVEN

SUBSEQUENT

TO

SEARCHES

WHEN CON-

ARREST-United States v.

Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).

On August 17, 1972, federal postal officials were advised by a
previously reliable informant that Henry Ogle Watson had a stolen
credit card in his possession.' Having learned from the informant,
one Khoury, that Watson desired to make additional stolen credit
cards available, the postal officials prevailed upon Khoury to arrange a
meeting with Watson. 2 Six days after the informant's initial contact, 3
the meeting took place in a public restaurant under the surveillance
of postal inspectors. 4 Upon receipt of a prearranged signal from
Khoury that Watson did possess stolen credit cards, the officers
moved in and placed Watson under arrest. The arrest was made
without a warrant having been previously obtained. 5 After removing
Watson to the street outside the restaurant, the postal inspectors
gave him his Miranda warnings and conducted a search of his person
and discovered no stolen credit cards. 6 The postal inspectors then
asked if they could search Watson's nearby automobile. 7 Watson gave
his permission, and he reiterated his approval even after being
cautioned by the officials that anything found would be used against
him." This search produced two allegedly stolen credit cards 9 which
formed the basis of a subsequent "indictment charging Watson with
possessing stolen mail."' 10
I United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 412 (1976). The informant's reliability was
well established by the fact that he had provided postal inspectors with credible information on numerous other occasions, some of which even related to Watson. Id.
2 Id. at 412-13.
3 The meeting had initially been arranged for August 22, 1972, but was cancelled
and rescheduled for the next day. Id. at 413.
4 id.
5 Id.
6
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. In response to the officer's request to search his car, Watson replied, " 'Go
ahead,' and he repeated these words when the inspector cautioned that '[i]f I find anything, it is going to go against you.' " Id. The inspectors used Watson's keys to enter
and search the vehicle. Id.
9 Id. The stolen credit cards were found in an envelope under the floor mat. Id.
10 Id. The specific statutory authority relied upon by the Government was 18 U.S.C.
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Challenging the validity of his arrest and the voluntariness of his
consent to search the car, Watson moved, prior to trial, for suppression of the credit cards." The motion having been denied, he was3
1
subsequently convicted.' 2 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that the postal inspectors' failure to obtain an arrest warrant
when there was sufficient time to do so was violative of the fourth
amendment.' 4 Additionally, in applying the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 15 the circuit
court found that the consent to search the car was not voluntarily
given by Watson, the invalidity of the arrest being an important factor in reaching this determination. 16
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 17 and, in United States v.
Watson, 18 reversed the Ninth Circuit. 19 The Court held that the warrantless arrest was valid and that Watson's consent to the automobile
search was voluntary. 20 Speaking for the majority, Justice White
premised the Court's holding upon both a specific statutory grant of
authority to make warrantless felony arrests and the existence of
§ 1708 (1970). United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 413 n.2 (1976). Section 1708 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever buys, receives, or conceals, or unlawfully has in his possession,
any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained
therein, which has been so stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstracted, as herein
described, knowing the same to have been stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstractedShall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1970).
11 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 413 (1976).
12 Id. at 414.
13 United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 411

(1976).
14Id. Relying on Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Ninth Circuit found that the Government "ha[d]
shown no 'exigent' circumstances which would justify not obtaining an arrest warrant
during the six-day interim." 504 F.2d at 852.
15 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973). For a more complete discussion of this case see notes
71-77 infra and accompanying text.
16 United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 411
(1976). The court noted that Watson was not merely in custody but was there as a result
of an infringement of fourth amendment rights. In addition, it pointed out that the defendant was not informed of his right to refuse consent. 504 F.2d at 853. Hence, the
court found "that the totality of circumstances strongly suggests coercion." Id. (emphasis added).
17United States v. Watson, 420 U.S. 924 (1975).
18 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
19 Id. at 425.

20 Id. at 414-15, 424-25.
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probable cause for the arrest. 2 1 With respect to the search of the car,
the Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated
in Bustamonte to determine the voluntariness of Watson's consent,
although he was already under custodial arrest at the time of the
search. In applying this test, the majority held that, since the arrest
was legal, the remaining circumstances did not vitiate the voluntari22
ness of the consent.
The Court's decision in Watson appears to be significant in two
major respects. For the first time the Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue of whether law enforcement officials must obtain an
arrest warrant, when they have sufficient time to do so, before making an arrest in a public place. 2 3 Additionally, the Court's decision
clearly sanctions the applicability of the Bustamonte standard for determining the voluntariness of consent to situations where an indi24
vidual is in custody and under arrest.
Since the significant element of the court of appeals' finding that
Watson's consent was involuntary was its determination that his arrest
was illegal, the Supreme Court addressed this issue first. In support
of its holding that Watson's arrest did not violate the fourth amendment, the Court first pointed to the specific congressional grant-18
U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3)-which empowers the Postal Service to authorize
its investigative employees to make warrantless felony arrests when
"'they have reasonable grounds to believe' " that a felony has been
or is being committed. 25 Furthermore, it was observed that the effect
21 Id.

at 423. The statute relied upon was 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (1970). 423 U.S. at

415. For a discussion of this statute and its implementing regulation see note 25 infra
and accompanying text.
22 423 U.S. at 424-25. For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding Watson's
consent see text accompanying note 81 infra.
In his concurrence, Justice Powell even went so far as to state that the voluntariness of the consent was so strong that it should be upheld even if the arrest were found
unconstitutional. 423 U.S. at 425. Justice Marshall, dissenting, pointed out that neither
the court of appeals nor the briefs before the Supreme Court dealt with the specific
question of consent given while in lawful custody. Id. at 435. He therefore would have
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for a more detailed determination concerning
the voluntariness of the consent. Id. at 435-36.
23 The Court spoke only of public arrest, thereby indicating it was not reaching the
issue of when an officer may enter a private residence without a warrant to effectuate an
arrest. See id. at 424. This fact was expressly noted by Justices Powell and Stewart in
their respective concurrences. Id. at 432-33.
24 Id. at 424-25. In Bustamonte, the Court specified that its holding was limited to a
non-custodial situation. 412 U.S. at 248-49.
25 423 U.S. at 415 (quoting from 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (1970)). This statute, in
pertinent part, authorizes investigative officials of the postal service to
make arrests without warrant for felonies cognizable under the laws of the
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of the Ninth Circuit's decision, if unmodified, would be to invalidate
section 3061(a)(3) in all cases where no "exigent circumstances" were
present. 2 6 Noting the existence of similar legislative grants of power
to other federal law enforcement agencies, 2 7 the Court perceived a
congressional judgment that the seizure of persons by statutorily designated officials without a warrant was constitutionally permissible if
probable cause existed. 28 Since probable cause was found to be present in the instant case, the Court concluded that the postal inspectors
acted within the scope of their statutory authority when Watson was
29
arrested in a public place.
The majority next buttressed its holding with reference to previous fourth amendment cases. It was determined that nothing in these
prior cases prohibited warrantless felony arrests where probable cause
did in fact exist. 3 0 Based upon these precedents, the Court reasoned
United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed or is committing such a felony.
18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (1970). This authority given to the Board of Governors of the
Postal Service was implemented pursuant to regulation. See 39 C.F.R. § 232.5(a) (1975).
26 423 U.S. at 415.
27 Id. at 415-16. For other examples of congressional authority empowering federal
officials to make warrantless arrests see 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1970) (F.B.I. agents); id.
§ 3053 (United States marshals); 21 U.S.C. § 878 (1972) (designated officers of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs).
28 423 U.S. at 415. This intent on the part of Congress is evidenced by its treatment
of the statute empowering agents of the F.B.I. to make warrantless arrests. The forerunner to the present version of 18 U.S.C. § 3052 had been interpreted as requiring federal
officers to obtain an arrest warrant when there was sufficient time to do so, and the
exception arose only in those instances where there was a likelihood that the person to
be arrested would be able to escape. In United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 634-35
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952), Judge Learned Hand, interpreting this
statute, held that it required agents to obtain an arrest warrant "when there is time to
obtain one," absent the possibility of escape. The year after Judge Hand's decision in
Coplon, Congress amended section 3052, eliminating the provision that required F.B.I.
agents to obtain warrants subject to the likelihood of the suspected felon's escape before
a warrant could be obtained. See Act of Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1221, § 1, 64 Stat. 1239,
amending 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1948) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1970)). Subsequently,
in Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
926 (1952), the District of Columbia Circuit noted that Congress' action in amending the
statute immediately after the opinion rendered by the Second Circuit reflected its desire to make clear that the power of F.B.I. agents to make warrantless arrests for felonies
committed in their presence should not be limited to instances where there was no time
to obtain a warrant. See also 423 U.S. at 423 n.13.
29 423 U.S. at 415.
30 Id. at 417-18. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925), the Supreme Court considered under what circumstances a search might be made without a
warrant and reiterated the customary rule that enforcement officials may make warrantless felony arrests based upon probable cause. Subsequently, the Court, in Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959), while finding that the facts did not sufficiently
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that the issue was not whether there was sufficient time to obtain an
arrest warrant, but rather "whether there was probable cause" to
make an arrest. 3 1 Thus, having found sufficient probable cause to
warrant the postal inspectors' actions with respect to Watson, the
32
Court held the arrest to be constitutionally valid.
Furthermore, the majority determined that these fourth amendment cases reflected "the ancient common-law rule" that a law enforcement officer could arrest for a felony without a warrant, provided
there were probable cause to do so. 33 This common law rule "has
34
survived substantially intact" in the majority of state jurisdictions.
In light of this long-standing collective judgment, the Watson Court,
prove the existence of probable cause, nonetheless found that the statute in question
"state[d] the constitutional standard"-allowing warrantless felony arrests where
probable cause exists. 361 U.S. at 100.
31 423 U.S. at 417-18. Using the standard for probable cause set forth in Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (reasonable grounds to believe that an offense "has been or is being committed") the Court, in Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959), held that under the facts of the case the federal narcotics agents had
probable cause to believe that Draper was committing a narcotics violation at the time
of the arrest. Id. at 313-14. The arrest was made pursuant to a federal statute which
empowered federal narcotics enforcement agents to make warrantless felony arrests.
Thus, the arrest, albeit without a warrant, was "lawful, and the subsequent search and
seizure, having been made incident to that lawful arrest, were likewise valid." 358 U.S.
at 310, 314 (footnote omitted).
Finding probable cause at the time of the arrest, the Court in Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 35, 40-42 (1963), held that, under the circumstances, the police actions of entering and searching the premises were not unreasonable. And in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 114 (1975), the Court held "that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." The Gerstein Court, while reiterating its preference for obtaining a
magistrate's review of the factual justification in assessing the existence of probable
cause, noted that "it ha[d] never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause
solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant." Id. at 113.
32 423 U.S. at 414-15, 424.
3 Id.
at 418-19. At common law, there were two conditions which attached to a
peace officer's right to make warrantless arrests. First, there had to be reasonable
grounds to believe that a felony had been committed, regardless of whether the crime
had in fact been committed; second, the officer had to have "reasonable belief in the
guilt" of the person being arrested. The power of private persons, on the other hand,
was limited to instances where a felony had actually been committed. Hall, Legal and
Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 566-67 (1936). See
also 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 343-45 (3d ed. 1955). The Watson majority
indicated that the 1792 Congress extended this common law authority to federal marshalls and their deputies by giving them the same power as the sheriffs in the various
states. 423 U.S. at 420-21.
34 423 U.S. at 421. For examples of jurisdictions which have codified this common
law rule see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1904(b) (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401(c)(1)
(1974); 16 Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.005 (1975); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney

1971).
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although acknowledging a preference for a magistrate's determination
of probable cause, nonetheless "decline[d] to transform this judicial
35
preference into a constitutional rule."
While at first blush the Court's holding appears to be soundly
based on past precedent, a closer examination of the prior fourth
amendment cases relied upon reveals that such reliance may have
been misplaced. Concededly, these cases do not require officers to
obtain warrants for felony arrests based upon probable cause; however, it is not clear that they lend strong support to the Watson
Court's determination that exigent circumstances need not be present
for a probable cause arrest to be valid. 3 6 This issue was not addressed
by the prior cases. For example, the primary issue in Carroll v.
United States,3 7 a case relied upon by the Watson majority, 38 was the
propriety of a warrantless automobile search. 3 9 Rather than squarely
addressing the issue of warrantless arrests, the Carroll Court merely
alluded to the common law rule governing warrantless felony arrests
in rejecting the assertion that the validity of the search was depen40
dent upon the validity of the arrest.
Similarly, in Draperv. United States, 4 1 Henry v. United States,42
and Ker v. California,4 3 all of which were relied upon by the Watson
majority,4 4 the Court was not primarily concerned with the arrest
issue presented in Watson, but rather the existence of probable

35423 U.S. at 423.
36 In his concurrence, Justice Powell conceded that -[n]one of the decisions cited
by the Court today squarely faced the issue" of whether the police, possessing probable
cause to make a felony arrest, must nevertheless obtain an arrest warrant when there is
time to do so. Id. at 426 n.i. Justice Marshall similarly agreed with the lack of precedential value of the cases relied upon by the majority. Id. at 436 (dissenting opinion).
37 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
38 423 U.S. at 417.
39267 U.S. at 134. Finding reasonable grounds to believe that the car in question
was transporting bootlegged liquor, the Court upheld the stopping and subsequent
search. Id. at 160-62. In upholding the validity of the search, the Court formulated a
special rule permitting the search of automobiles without a warrant. Id. at 153. It
premised its holding on the impracticability of obtaining search warrants in these circumstances. Id. The Carroll Court stated that
[t]he right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the
right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer
has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.
Id. at 158-59.
40 Id. at 156-59.
41 358
42

U.S. 307 (1959).

361 U.S. 98 (1959).

43 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
44 423 U.S. at 417-18.
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cause. In fact, the Draper Court never addressed the issue of the
practicability of obtaining an arrest warrant4 5 and was concerned
primarily with whether an on-the-spot verification of information previously obtained from a reliable informant constituted probable
cause. 46 The Henry Court faced the issue of whether or not observations of the suspects' allegedly suspicious activity by FBI agents
gave them probable cause to arrest them. 47 While the Court in
Henry declared that the relevant statute authorizing FBI agents to
make warrantless felony arrests "state[d] the constitutional standard,"
this was not central to its holding. 48 The Court in Ker did not even
confront the issue of the validity of a warrantless arrest where there is
time to obtain a warrant, since it was determined that "time clearly
was of the essence. -49 Rather, the issues before the Ker Court were
the existence vel non of probable cause to arrest and the propriety of
the mode of entry used to effectuate the arrest and accompanying
search. 50 In another case cited by the Watson majority, the suspect
See 358 U.S. at 310. Rather, the key issue addressed by the Court in Draper was
whether knowledge of the related facts and circumstances gave [the arresting
agent] "probable cause" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and
"reasonable grounds" . . . to believe that petitioner had committed or was
committing a violation of the narcotic laws.
Id. at 310 (footnote omitted).
46Id. at 309-10, 313. The arresting officer, Marsh, an experienced federal narcotics
agent, had been tipped off by a " 'special employee' " of known reliability. Id. at 309.
The informer had told Marsh on September 3, 1956, of Draper's actions as a narcotics
dealer. Id. Four days later, the informant told the agent that Draper had left for Chicago
and would return by train within a day or two with drugs. Id. "[A] detailed physical
description of Draper" was then given to the authorities. Id.
Subsequently, Marsh saw Draper depart from the train; his description matched
perfectly with the one previously given. Id. at 309, 313. It was this personal verification
of information given by the informant which the Court deemed sufficient to establish
probable cause. Id. at 313.
47361 U.S. 98, 98-100. In assessing the existence of probable cause, the Court
found that the facts were insufficient to allow the reasonable inference that defendant
Henry was violating the law, and it therefore invalidated the arrest. Id. at 102.
Apparently, two F.B.I. agents were investigating the theft of a shipment of whiskey
from interstate commerce. Id. at 99. They were given information " 'concerning the implication of the defendant Pierotti [an associate of Henry's] with interstate shipments.' "
Id. The agents followed Henry's automobile. Shortly after seeing cartons being loaded
into the vehicle, the officers made the arrest and seized the cartons which were later
found to contain stolen radios. Id. at 99-100. The Henry Court found defendant's actions
"outwardly innocent" and, therefore, insufficient to form the basis of probable cause. Id.
at 103-04.
45

48 Id. at 100.

49374 U.S. at 42.
50 Id. at 34-35, 37-38. The officers' actions were predicated upon their personal
observations as well as corroborative information previously obtained from an informant.
Id. at 25-28.
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was arrested pursuant to an administrative warrant; 5 1 however, in
that case the primary issue before the Court was the validity of the
search subsequent to the arrest.52
It would thus seem that upon a careful reading, the case law
relied upon by the Watson Court does not fully sustain the conclusion reached. Nor does the common law appear to provide conclusive
support. The general rule for warrantless felony arrests at common
law is that a peace officer may arrest upon probable cause even if the
felony was not committed in his presence. In fact, a felony need not
actually have been perpetrated. 53 A peace officer could not, however,
execute an arrest if the alleged crime was a misdemeanor unless
it amounted to a "breach of the peace ...

presence."

a

committed in his

In the early period of English common law, there ex-

isted no statute empowering justices of the peace to issue warrants

for the arrest of those suspected of having committed felonies. 55 This
The officers had gained entrance to Ker's apartment by use of a passkey obtained
from the building manager. Id. at 28. Ker attacked the mode of entry as violative of his
fourth amendment rights. Id. at 37. The Court, however, found that in light of the exigent circumstances present in this case the mode of entry was "sanctioned by the law of
California" and "was not unreasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment
as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 40-41.
51 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1960). Attention had been drawn to
defendant Abel when the F.B.I. had informed agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he was suspected of espionage and was residing illegally in the United
States. Id. at 221-22. Abel was arrested in his hotel room and served with an order "to
show cause why he should not be deported." Id. at 222.
52 Id. at 218-19. The Abel Court specifically eschewed any consideration of the validity of the arrest warrant. Id. at 230-31. Rather, in sustaining the administrative arrest
and subsequent seizure, the majority expressly stated that defendant's claim as to the
invalidity of the administrative warrant was not properly before the Court. Id. The
Court noted that by including portions of the transcript of the motion to suppress, questions as to the validity of the arrest warrant had been "expressly disavowed" by Abel's
counsel. Id.
The Watson majority also relied upon Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), even
though, as in Abel, the question of the validity of the warrantless arrest in Gerstein was
determined to be not properly before the Court. See id. at 105, 111. In Gerstein, the
pimary issue was whether an individual who was incarcerated pending trial on a
prosecutor's information had a right to a judicial finding of probable cause. Id. In fact,
the Court noted in passing that it was unclear whether the defendant's arrest had or had
not been pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 105 n.1.
53 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 84-85 (1st Am. ed. 1847); see also 10
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 343-45 (3d ed. 1955); 1 J. CHITrY, CRIMINAL LAW
18-19 (1819).
54 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 345 (3d ed. 1955). What constituted a
breach of the peace at common law was not clearly delineated. Rather, " '[b]reach of
peace [was] a generic term including violations of public peace or order.' " Wilgus,
Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 574 (1924) (footnote omitted).
55 Wilgus, supra note 54, at 548. If necessary to effectuate a warrantless felony ar-
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power to issue arrest warrants was gradually assumed by the common
law justices. 56 However, the constable's power to make summary arrests of alleged felons continued. 57 It was generally felt that the public welfare necessitated the immediate arrest of those reasonably sus58
pected of having committed felonies.
The Watson Court's reference to the common law authority to
make warrantless felony arrests is less persuasive when one considers
the definitional distinctions between common law and modern day
felonies. 59 A common law felony encompassed "[o]nly the most serious crimes. '"60 Today, however, statutory felony classifications often

rest, a constable could break into a house to take a suspected offender into custody. I J.
CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 19-20 (1819).

5 Wilgus, supra note 54, at 548.
57 Id. The leading case of Samuel v. Payne, I Doug. 359, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B.

1780), cited by the Watson Court, 423 U.S. at 419, expanded the wide powers already
enjoyed by constables. There, Lord Mansfield held that a felony charge by a private
individual was sufficient justification for a constable to execute an arrest. Samuel v.
Payne, supra at 359-60, 99 Eng. Rep. at 230-31. He went on to say that even if no
felony had in fact been committed a constable who makes a warrantless felony arrest
upon reasonable grounds would not be liable in an action for false imprisonment, because
it would be most mischievous that the officer should be bound first to try, and
at his peril exercise his judgment on the truth of the charge.
Id. at 360, 99 Eng. Rep. at 231. Uncertainty remained as to the liability of peace officers
for warrantless felony arrests until 1827 in Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & C. 635, 108 Eng.
Rep. 585 (K.B. 1827), where the court held that a constable need only show reasonable
grounds for suspecting that a felony had been committed to justify imprisoning a suspect.
Id. at 637, 108 Eng. Rep. at 585-86. It was there stated that
It]here is this distinction between a private individual and a constable: in
order to justify the former in causing the imprisonment of a person, he must
not only make out a reasonable ground of suspicion, but he must prove that a
felony has actually been committed; whereas a constable having reasonable
ground to suspect that a felony has been committed, is authorized to detain
the party suspected until inquiry can be made by the proper authorities.
Id. at 638-39, 108 Eng. Rep. at 586. For a general discussion of the development of the
constable's arrest power at common law see 1 J. CHIUrrY, CRIMINAL LAW 17-22 (1819);
Hall, supra note 33, at 567-78.
58 See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 582 (2d ed.

1952), where it is stated that "felons ought to be summarily arrested and put in gaol."
See also 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 85-86 (1st Am. ed. 1847); 1 J. STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND

189 (1883); Wilgus, supra note 54, at

560.
59423 U.S. at 438-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60Id. at 439 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The common law felonies were those crimes
for which the punishment required "a forfeiture of all the offender's lands, or goods." 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *95. At common law, the definition of felony encompassed "felonious homicide (divided by statutes into murder and manslaughter), mayhem, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, prison breach ....
and rescue of a felon."
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 10-11 (2d ed. 1969) (footnotes omitted).
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include generally all those offenses which are punishable by impris61
onment.
Finally, the Watson Court turned to pragmatic policy considerations to further reinforce its holding as to the arrest. It was asserted
that adherence to the standard governing searches, i.e., that a warrant must be obtained in all but exigent circumstances, 6 2 would result
in "endless litigation" over such issues as the practicability of obtaining a warrant, whether the suspect was likely to flee, and other questions relating to the existence of exigent circumstances. 63 While this
potential for excessive litigation is a valid policy consideration, it
should not stand as an impasse to constitutional protections. 64
Justice Powell, concurring, offered another policy consideration
militating against the imposition of a warrant requirement for felony
arrests when sufficient time to obtain the warrant exists. It was asserted that such a requirement "could severely hamper effective law
enforcement" by pressuring officers to obtain an arrest warrant as
soon as probable cause exists, thereby bringing a halt to the investigatory process before sufficient evidence for a conviction is obtained. 6 5 There certainly exists a societal interest in ultimately convicting guilty parties which at times necessitates continued police
investigation beyond the point where probable cause to arrest is
established. 66 However, it is doubtful that the imposition of a warrant
61 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-7 (Smith-Hurd 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.

274, § 1 (1968). Under federal law, however, a felony is limited to those offenses which
are "punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1970).
62 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1967); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948).
63 423 U.S. at 423-24.
64 In his concurring opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Justice Harlan, while recognizing that the
expenditure of concededly limited judicial resources is a "substantial policy consideration," nevertheless concluded that this "should not be permitted to stand in the way of
otherwise sound constitutional principles." Id. at 410-11.
65 423 U.S. at 431-32 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell premised his argument
on the fact that efficient police investigatory practice often necessitates the postponement of arrests "even after probable cause has been established." Id. at 431. This is
because evidence required for probable cause is less than "the level required to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 431 n.4. Therefore, it was reasoned that the
police should have the prerogative to obtain an arrest warrant when they feel that they
have collected sufficiently convincing evidence to obtain a conviction, rather than having to seek a warrant the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause. Id. at 431-32. If the police obtain an arrest warrant the moment that probable cause arises but delay in effectuating it in order to obtain additional evidence, they
run the risk, according to Justice Powell, that the warrant will grow stale. Id. at 432.
66 Id. at 431 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
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requirement would jeopardize that societal interest. Arrest warrants
rarely grow stale between the time they are procured and the time of
their execution. 67 Law enforcement officials would still be free to exercise their professional judgment concerning the proper moment to
68 It
effectuate an arrest during the course of their investigation.
would appear, therefore, that the imposition of a warrant requirement in felony arrests would not place significant pressure on police
to cut short investigations before sufficient evidence to convict has
been obtained.
In addition to its holding with regard to warrantless felony arrests, the Watson decision is significant in that it squarely applies the
"totality of the circumstances" test to a consent to be searched given
by a suspect while under arrest. 69 Under this test, a court looks to all
of the surrounding circumstances, with the knowledge of the right to
refuse to be searched being but one of the factors in determining the
voluntariness of the consent. 70 The "totality of the circumstances" test
was first adopted by the Court in the landmark case of Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 7 1 but was confined to a situation where the consenting
72
party was not under arrest.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Joines, 258 F.2d 471 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
880 (1958), wherein the Third Circuit held that the failure to execute an arrest warrant
for three weeks, despite sufficient opportunity to do so "did not render the warrant
invalid." 258 F.2d at 472. Recognizing that there may be legitimate reasons for the
police to postpone an arrest, the court went on to hold that "there is no constitutional
right to be arrested promptly or otherwise." Id. at 472-73.
68 In Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court held that to
provide grounds for reversal arising from pre-arrest delay, the claimant must affirmatively prove "that there was no legitimate reason for the delay, and that he was prejudiced by the delay." Id. at 708. Cf. Jones v. United States, 402 F.2d 639, 641 & n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (unreasonable delay in making arrest, which impairs defendant's ability to account for his actions, is sufficient ground for reversal).
Some courts have even gone so far as to allow law enforcement officials to postpone
arrests made without a warrant. See Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 944 (1961), wherein the Second Circuit held that "[d]elay by law enforcement officers in arresting a suspect does not ordinarily affect the legality of the
arrest." 286 F.2d at 846. Despite the delay in effectuating a warrantless arrest for more
than three months, the court stated that investigative officials have the prerogative to
postpone an arrest in order to "strengthen their case." Id.
69 423 U.S. at 424.
70 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
7' 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
72 Id. at 248. The pre-Bustamonte Court cases dealing with consent searches fol-

lowed a wavering line of development. The first case in which the Court addressed the
issue was Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), where, in invalidating a search
"demand[ed]" by internal revenue agents, the Court spoke in terms of waiver of a
defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 315-17.
This waiver approach was ignored in the case of Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
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The Bustamonte Court rejected the constitutional-waiver approach that consent to search was "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege," 73 which would have required that the consenting party know of his right to refuse. 74 This
requirement had been held applicable in previous fifth and sixth
amendment cases. 75 The Bustamonte Court identified the purpose of
the fifth and sixth amendments as ensuring the right to a fair criminal
trial. 76 Fourth amendment rights, on the other hand, protect individual privacy from unreasonable intrusion. 77 The Court therefore
reasoned that
[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly
different order, and have nothing whatever to 78
do with promoting
the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial.
Consequently, it was determined that a prophylactic warning of the
582 (1946), which dealt with a consent search, given only after the government agents
indicated that they would break in to obtain the evidence. Id. at 586-87. The Court
upheld the search on the ground that the property seized-gasoline ration coupons-at
all times belonged to the Government and was "subject to inspection and recall by it."
Id. at 588, 593-94. The Court distinguished Amos as involving the seizure of private
papers from a private residence. Id. at 592.
In Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), decided the same day as Davis, the,
Court upheld the use of evidence obtained during an audit of the defendant's books
conducted over his protest. Id. at 627, 630. While apparently looking at all of the circumstances, the Court rested its decision upon the fact that the defendant, in accepting
the government contract, impliedly waived his fourth amendment rights. Id. at 628-29.
Two years later, in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the Court invalidated a search conducted after the defendant had allegedly acquiesced to the officer's
entering her hotel room. Id. at 12, 16-17. The Court, citing Amos, declared that the
permission to enter "was granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right." Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
Finally, in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), a consent which followed an officer's claim that he was in possession of a search warrant was deemed
invalid. Id. at 546, 548. The Court made no allusion to the constitutional-waiver standard, but rather averred that the prosecution had failed to shoulder its "burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given." Id. at 548 (footnote
omitted).
73 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). In Johnson, two defendants who had
"'stated that they were ready for trial," were tried and convicted without the aid of
counsel. Id. at 460. The Court, in reversing, held that a waiver of one's sixth amendment right to counsel must be knowingly and intelligently made. Id. at 464-65.
74 412 U.S. at 235, 246.
75 See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (right of confrontation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (right against self-incrimination, right to
counsel); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957) (double jeopardy); Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (jury trial).
76 412 U.S. at 236-37.
77 Id. at 228.
78 Id. at 242.
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79
suspect's right to withhold consent was not required.
In Watson, the Ninth Circuit had found that the defendant
neither knew nor was told of his right to refuse consent to the search
of his car. 80 This, along with the fact that Watson was determined to
have been illegally arrested, vitiated the voluntariness of the con-

sent. 8 ' In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court reaffirmed

its reasoning in Bustamonte and rather summarily applied the "totality of the circumstances" test. 8 2 The Court's determination that
Watson's consent was freely given was premised on several key factors: Watson was legally under arrest; he was not threatened with
force or subjected to more subtle types of pressure; no promises were
made by the postal inspectors; Watson was on a public street when
he gave his consent; there was nothing to indicate that he "was a
newcomer to the law"; he was advised of his Miranda rights; and he
was further warned that anything found in the car would be used
against him. 83 The majority thereby concluded that the "totality of

the circumstances" indicated that Watson's consent was by "his own
essentially free and unconstrained choice.' "84
In his dissent, Justice Marshall reiterated the position he had
taken in Bustamonte-that a prophylactic warning should be required
whenever consent to a search is sought from an individual. 8 5 Fur79 Id.

at 231-33. The "totality of the circumstances" test as enunciated in Busta-

monte was the product of a line of pre-Miranda decisions concerning the voluntariness

of in-custody confessions. Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 241 (1974).
Justice Traynor's analysis in People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955),
became the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's formal adoption of the "totality of the
circumstances" test. 412 U.S. at 221, 230-31. It was held in Michael that
[w]hether in a particular case an apparent consent was in fact voluntarily
given or was in submission to an express or implied assertion of authority, is a
question of fact to be determined in the light of all the circumstances.

45 Cal. 2d at 753, 290 P.2d at 854. The California court reasoned that a contrary holding,
whereby the police would have to prove that the defendant knew he had the right to
refuse consent,
would permit the criminal to defeat his prosecution by voluntarily revealing
all of the evidence against him and then contending that he acted only in
response to an implied assertion of unlawful authority.

Id. at 754, 290 P.2d at 854.
80 United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 411
(1976).
"I United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 411
(1976).
83

423 U.S. at 424-25.
Id. (footnote omitted).

84

Id. at 424 (quoting from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)).

82

85 423 U.S. at 457.
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thermore, the dissenting Justice asserted that even were this position
not accepted, the fact that Watson's consent was given while in custody should compel the Government to demonstrate effectively that
he knew he had the right to withhold consent. 86 Justice Marshall also
contended that a "custodial interrogation is inherently coercive," and
therefore the fact of custody should in itself be determinative of the
lack of voluntariness of a consent and not just another factor to be
weighed. 87
Although it is true that the Court in Bustamonte did distinguish
between a custodial and a noncustodial situation, its analysis indicated that by the term "custodial" it was referring to "the specter of
incommunicado police interrogation. "88 The in-custody situation in
Watson was far removed from the inherently coercive atmosphere
that prompted the Court in Miranda v. Arizona8 9 to establish such a
prophylactic warning rule. On the contrary, Watson's arrest and subsequent consent to the search occurred within a matter of minutes of
one another, 90 and there was no showing that he had been pressured
into giving the consent. 9 1 In fact, the evidence clearly showed that
Watson was repeatedly cautioned that any incriminating evidence
92
found would be used against him.
While Watson is the first case in which the Supreme Court
squarely addressed the issue, application of the Bustamonte standard
to an in-custody consent is not unique. Lower courts, in assessing the
voluntariness of consents, have not hesitated to apply the "totality of
the circumstances" test to such situations. For example, in United
States v. Horton, 93 the Fifth Circuit expressly stated that the standard
for judging the voluntariness of consent is the same whether an individual "is under arrest or in custody." 9 4 Applying the "totality of the
circumstances" test, the circuit court upheld the voluntariness of the
Id. at 457-58.
87Id. Justice Marshall pointed out that the Bustamonte Court had distinguished
86

between custodial and non-custodial situations and had relied on this distinction in
reaching its conclusion. Id. at 457. Bustamonte in turn had relied upon Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as the basis for this distinction. 412 U.S. at 232.
88 412 U.S. at 247.
89

384 U.S. 436, 478-89 (1966). Miranda had been arrested at his home and brought

to a police station for questioning. Id. at 491. He was interrogated for approximately two
hours at the end of which the police "officers emerged from the interrogation room with
a written confession signed by Miranda." Id. at 491-92.
90 See 423 U.S. at 413.
91 See id. at 424-25.
92 Id. at 413, 425.
93 488 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
94 488 F.2d at 380 n.4.
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consent despite the facts that the defendant had been arrested and
handcuffed and was not given his Miranda warnings. 95 Likewise, the
Second Circuit, in United States v. Miley, 96 held that an arrest did
not in' and of itself preclude the finding that a subsequent consent
97
was voluntary.
The Ninth Circuit has also applied Bustainonte standards in assessing the voluntariness of an in-custody consent. In United States v.
Heiinforth,98 the court squarely held that the " 'totality of circumstances' test applies to all consent searches regardless of whether the
consenting party is in police custody when the consent is requested." 99 Similarly, in United States v. Townsend, 100 it was stated
that consent given in a custodial situation is merely one factor to be
considered in light of all the circumstances. '0 '
However, in United States v. Rothman, 10 2 the Ninth Circuit had
applied the Bustamonte test with a different result. In finding the
defendant's consent to be the product of coercion, the court relied
heavily upon the facts that he had been held incommunicado and
interrogated prior to giving his consent to the search. 10 3 While the

95 Id. at 377, 380-81. In assessing the surrounding circumstances, the appeals court
found "no evidence in the record of any intimidation, physical or psychological abuse,
or threats tending to invalidate the consent." Id. at 381. Defendant Horton twice gave
his express consent to a search of the automobile. Id. at 380-81. The investigating
agents were further assisted by Horton, who supplied the key and identified the luggage wherein heroin was found. Id. at 378, 381. See also United States v. Luton, 486 F.2d
1021 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
96 513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975).
97 513 F.2d at 1201-02. The court of appeals pointed out that the lower court had
clearly considered all of the surrounding circumstances, and it refused to overturn the
trial judge's determination that the defendant's consent was voluntary. Id. at 1201.
98 493 F.2d 970 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908 (1974).
99 493 F.2d at 972. The circuit court remanded the case to the district court "for the
limited purpose of" making a more detailed finding concerning the voluntariness of
the consent. Id. See also Hayes v. Cady, 500 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1058 (1974), where the court, relying on Heimforth, agreed that the Bustamonte standard controls even where the consenting party was in custody. 500 F.2d at 1214.
100 510 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975).
101 Id. at 1146. See also United States v. Kohn, 365 F. Supp. 1031, 1032-34 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
102 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973).
103 Id. at 1264-65. Rothman had been arrested at an airport after assaulting a federal
deputy. Id. at 1263. He was handcuffed and given his Miranda warnings. Id. Refusing
to allow the officers to open his luggage, he was interrogated for approximately two
hours and finally acquiesced and opened his luggage. Id. at 1263-64.
The circuit court averred that "[a]rrest is but one factor, albeit a critical one, in
determining whether or not the consent was voluntary." Id. at 1264 n.I. Finding that
the consent was the product of psychological coercion and the search was neither inci-
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Rothman court reached a different result than the Watson Court, the
cases would appear to be easily reconciled on the basis that Rothman's
consent was "systematically psychologically coerced," 1' 04 whereas Watson's was not.1 0 5
Thus, the position taken in Watson appears to be wholly consistent with the decisions of lower courts faced with the issue of the
voluntariness of an in-custody consent. The Court's decision in Watson, as in Bustamonte, reflects a determination to provide greater
flexibility to law enforcement officials acting in their investigative
capacity. Simultaneously, the Court has implicitly reaffirmed the position that the lower courts, both state and federal, should stand sentinel over the rights of individuals by closely scrutinizing all the cir06
cumstances surrounding the voluntariness of a consent.
While the Court's position on the issue of consent is not particularly unsettling, its position concerning warrantless felony arrests is
somewhat more troublesome. Previous cases have uniformly held
that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant must be obtained before a lawful search may be conducted. ' 0 7 What the Watson case has
now held is that where there exists probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed a felony, he may be arrested in a public
place whether or not it is practical to obtain a warrant.' 0 8 Thus, the
Court has made clear that the validity of warrantless searches and the
validity of warrantless felony arrests are to be judged by different
standards. While this position has never before been directly espoused
by the Court, its genesis can be traced to prior case law. For example,
such a posture can be seen in Trupiano v. United States, 10 9 a case
dent to the defendant's arrest nor a valid administrative search, the court reversed
Rothman's conviction. Id. at 1265-66.
104

Id. at 1265.

105 423 U.S. at 424-25.
106See id. In all consent situations an extremely difficult factual determination is

involved. Not only is the exact language used by the officer important, but the tone and
innuendo are equally crucial. Wefing & Miles, supra note 79, at 216. While it can be
said that this argues in favor of a rule requiring that the individual be advised of his
fourth amendment rights, such a prophylactic rule may be easily undermined by police
abuse. Comment, Consent Searches: A ReappraisalAfter Miranda v.Arizona, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 130, 158-59 (1967). In the final analysis, allowing lower courts to scrutinize
all the circumstances involved may provide greater protection of individual fourth amendment rights. 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 556, 560 (1974).
107 See cases cited note 62 supra.
108423 U.S. at 415, 423-24.
109 334 U.S. 699 (1948). Trupiano was overruled in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950), "[t]o the extent that [it] require[d] a search warrant solely upon the basis
of the practicability of procuring it." Id. at 66 (citation omitted). The rule established in
Rabinowitz-that the test to determine the validity of a search "is not whether it is
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not cited by the majority in Watson. 1 10 In dealing with the right to
search incident to a lawful arrest, the Trupiano Court held that such
a search would not be upheld if there was prior opportunity to obtain a search warrant."' Yet the failure to obtain an arrest warrant
despite sufficient time to do so did not invalidate the arrest, since
the officers had actually observed the illegal activity.112
In fact, one circuit court upheld a warrantless arrest made fourteen days after the commission of a felony. 113 Similarly, in another
case, an arrest "made two weeks after the last transaction by an officer with personal knowledge of appellant's activities," was upheld. 1 14 And finally, it has been held that where there is probable
115
cause, the failure to obtain a warrant does not invalidate the arrest.
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable,"
id-was itself overruled in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760, 768 (1969). See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n.13 (1975).
110 Trupiano was, however, cited by Justice Powell in his concurrence. 423 U.S. at
426-27 n.1.
111 334 U.S. at 705, 708. The Court in Trupiano pointed out that the fourth amendment requires that "law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants
wherever reasonably practicable." Id. at 705. The arrest, however, was upheld, despite
the lack of a warrant. Id. at 704-05.
112Id. at 705. Federal agents had knowledge for at least three weeks that certain
buildings on a farm were being used for the illicit distilling of whiskey. The agents
were led onto the farm by the owner-informer whereupon an agent observed one of the
petitioners engaged in illicit distilling. Id. at 701-02, 704. The petitioner was arrested
and the contraband was seized. Id. at 702. Both the arrest and the search were conducted without the use of a warrant. Id. at 703.
113 Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870, 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 969 (1959). Dailey was arrested for selling narcotics to a merchant seaman who
was, in fact, an undercover agent. 261 F.2d at 871. The court found the arresting officers
had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was violating the narcotic laws. Id. The
court then went on to state that there was no requirement that the officers execute the
arrest immediately after probable cause arose, for
[i]f an arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has
violated the narcotic laws, he may defer the arrest for a day, a week, two
weeks, or perhaps longer.
Id. at 872 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Figueroa, 204 F. Supp. 641, 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (one-month delay in effectuating the defendant's arrest did not affect its
legality).
114 Abramson v. United States, 326 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
957 (1964). Relying upon Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 969 (1959), the court stated that warrantless arrests were valid in narcotics cases. 326 F.2d at 567. It has been suggested, however, that narcotics cases have
been singled out by courts for special treatment. 8 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 415, 418 (1964).
115 Mills v. United States, 196 F.2d 600, 602 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826
(1952). Likewise, in United States v. Swanner, 237 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), the
district court held that the lapse of approximately five weeks between the commission
of the felony in the officer's presence and the making of the arrest did not invalidate
that arrest. Id. at 72.
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Thus, the Watson Court did not break totally new ground in its holding as to the warrantless arrest.
By its decision in Watson, the Court has decided that a determination of probable cause by a police officer, based upon a reasonable belief that a felony has been committed, is sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest in a public place. 116 This position, as Justice Powell
17
pointed out in his concurring opinion, does create a legal anomaly.1
The fourth amendment addresses searches and seizures equally, and
"an arrest . .. is quintessentially a seizure."' 118 As such, the
affording

of less protection to those being arrested than those having their person or property searched would appear questionable.
Furthermore, effective law enforcement would not be hindered
by the imposition of an arrest warrant requirement where it is practicable to obtain one. Warrantless felony arrests would still be upheld
where exigent circumstances exist. Moreover, police investigations
would not be encumbered. 119 On the other hand, the requirement of
an arrest warrant with its attendant judicial scrutiny of the existence
of probable cause would certainly minimize unnecessary invasions of
privacy. There would appear to be no reason to place greater trust in
a police officer's determination of probable cause to arrest than in his
determination of probable cause to search. 1 20 A balancing of the
competing policy interests involved would therefore seem to compel
the imposition of identical standards for arrests and for searches.
With regard to the Court's disposition of Watson's consent to be
searched, the application of the "totality of the circumstances" test to
an in-custody situation may be a desirable result in view of the absence
of any extremely coercive police tactics in the case. It is arguable,
however, that when consent is obtained from an individual subjected
to the more inherently coercive atmosphere of a station-house interrogation, a prophylactic warning of the right to withhold consent
116See note 23 supra. However, the Watson Court's limitation of its holding to warrantless felony arrests made in public has subsequently been extended. In United States
v. Santana, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2410 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public
place, and is therefore proper under Watson, by the expedient of escaping to a
private place.
In Santana, the suspect had entered the hallway of her home in an effort to avoid the
police officers. The officers then followed her through the open door and effectuated
the warrantless arrest. Id. at 2408.
117 423 U.S. at 427.
11s Id.

at 428.
119 See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
120 See

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
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should be given. While the application of the Bustamonte standard
was probably correct under the particular facts of Watson, the flexibility of this standard imposes a special responsibility on lower courts to
carefully scrutinize the dynamic interplay of competing factors surrounding police-suspect encounters. 12 1 It thus becomes more essential than ever that lower courts be extremely vigilant in standing sentinel over the fourth amendment rights of individual citizens.
Marc Evan Richards
121

See 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 556 (1974).

